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Family reunification for migrants under 
subsidiary protection in Germany: 
An instrument for strategic political positioning 
Matthias Busse and Lars Ludolph 
The debate over migration policy played a major role in the recent collapse of German coalition 
talks, a first indication of how the AfD changed the country’s political discourse. 
or anyone unfamiliar with the current political climate in Germany, it may seem absurd 
that the topic of family reunification was a focal point in the country’s coalition talks 
between CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens. Nevertheless, the polarised views of party 
representatives on migration played an important role in the collapse of exploratory talks to 
form Germany’s next coalition government.  
Both CDU/CSU and FDP took a hard stance on limiting the right of the 200,000 persons currently 
residing in Germany under subsidiary protection – a level of protection below full refugee status 
- to bring their families into the country, while the Greens fully supported their right to family 
reunification. This position within CDU/CSU and FDP is particularly puzzling as the additional 
number of expected family migrants is estimated to reach only 50,000 to 60,000, if the partners 
and children of those under subsidiary protection were granted the right of family reunification. 
These numbers are relatively low since many refugees under subsidiary protection had arrived 
with their family members or had already been reunited before their reunification rights were 
suspended. Moreover, many of those under subsidiary protection are not married and do not 
have children. Thus, the number of additional family migrants is just barely higher than the 
allotment of asylum-seekers under the reallocation scheme. Both numbers in fact are miniscule 
compared to the 800,000 asylum applications Germany has already accepted since the 
beginning of 2015.   
In general, a number of reasons could be adduced as a plausible motivation for a political party 
to call for less family reunification.  
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First, a restriction may look sensible from a purely public finance perspective. In the EU, family 
migrants form the most vulnerable group in the labour market and their average employment 
rate is even slightly below that of refugees. Since family reunification for those under subsidiary 
protection, as presently envisaged, would apply mostly to Syrians, employment rates would 
likely turn out to be even lower in this group due to the large number of females waiting to be 
reunited with their partners and the wide gender gap in employment in Syria.  
On the other hand, recent, more nuanced qualitative studies underline a large negative effect 
of family separation on the well-being of refugees settled in Germany. Whether these 
psychological effects would also translate into worse future labour market outcomes of this 
disadvantaged group remains unclear, but it certainly cannot be ruled out. In any case, it should 
be kept in mind that it will most likely be impossible for most of those under subsidiary 
protection to return to their home countries in the foreseeable future. Thus, denying them the 
right to family reunification may well have negative long-term consequences not only for the 
individuals but also for their families. 
Second, to put things into perspective, it should be noted that, while in comparison to other 
OECD countries, Germany is generally not overly restrictive on family reunification, the right is 
mostly limited to core family members. Relatives outside the core family such as grandparents 
or adult children can only enter Germany through reunification in exceptional cases. But 
Germany does not stand alone in restricting family reunification as a response to the large 
inflows of refugees to EU countries in 2015 and 2016. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden all tightened their rules on family reunification in 2016, particularly for those under 
temporary or subsidiary protection. Both the CDU/CSU’s and FDP’s strong stance could thus be 
interpreted as a natural move towards tighter restrictions following a very large inflow of 
migrants. Germany, in fact, has a history of reacting to large inflows of asylum seekers with 
restrictive policies. In the early 1990s, when 320,000 Bosnians entered the country following 
the breakup of former Yugoslavia, only temporary protection status was granted to refugees, 
which prevented regular access to the labour market and organised family reunification. 
Third, politicians may fear that opening family reunification could render Germany more 
attractive to asylum-seekers still on the march; it is debatable, however, whether the rights of 
the comparatively small group of persons under subsidiary protection would have a large 
impact on the incentive structure.  
Our view is that none of these factors constitutes the main motivation driving those German 
parties to advocate more restrictive migration policies. The Union parties, in particular, 
traditionally attach much importance to the role of the family and view it as an essential part 
of German culture. Consequently, they would regard family reunification as an important 
building block in efforts to integrate refugees into German society. This conviction would clearly 
conflict with any attempt to restrict family reunification. And for the FDP, migration has simply 
never been a core issue. 
In the context of the current political climate in Germany, it is thus much more likely that –the 
political parties are taking a hard stance on family reunification as a highly visible manoeuvre 
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to strategically position themselves against the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in the new 
German Bundestag. The AfD is a far-right party that won 12.6% of the vote during the recent 
German federal elections by running a campaign mostly on an anti-immigration platform and 
inflammatory rhetoric. The party succeeded in persuading a significant number of voters to 
defect from the established parties, including more than a million from Merkel’s CDU. 
The emphasis any party puts on restrictions to migration thus provides a first indication of what 
can be expected from the future German government. The AfD, despite having won only 92 
out of the 709 seats in the new German Bundestag, has already left its mark on German politics. 
A hard line on family reunification will not remain the last attempt to win voters back from the 
AfD. This is another reminder that the influence exercised by right-wing parties on national 
policies goes beyond their simple share of the vote and seats in parliament. 
 
 
 
